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Can ‘Sin Industries’ Prove Their Legitimacy Through CSR Reporting? 
A Study of UK Tobacco and Gambling Companies 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the ways that sin industry companies attempt to 
utilise CSR reporting for legitimation. 
Design/methodology/approach – Conventional and summative content analyses were carried out 
on annual CSR reports in UK tobacco and gambling companies, juxtaposed against analysis of the 
actual behaviour of the companies, collectively and individually. 
Findings – The paper concludes that there is an ongoing tension between the business of sin 
industry companies and their attempts to establish and maintain any legitimacy, using CSR reporting 
in particular ways to try to prove their credentials to society and to engage salient stakeholder 
support. Ultimately, they aim to give themselves the scope for strategic choice to enable survival 
and financial flourishing. 
Research limitations/implications – Further research on CSR on other sin industries and in other 
jurisdictions with different regulatory situations could shed further light on the achievement or 
denial of different types of legitimacy. Studying different time periods as industries change would be 
of value. 
Originality/value – This study allowed for a comprehensive, dynamic, and inclusive understanding of 
the interplay of CSR reporting and legitimacy by addressing conflicting interests between sin 
companies’ social effects and inherent activities at the industry level. The methodology of multiple 
case study design in two sin industries combined content analysis of CSR reports, juxtaposed against 
analysis of behaviour in context. Previous research included the juxtaposition of actuality in analysis 
of only single case studies or particular issues. Thus, this research allows for a broader industry 
understanding. On a practical basis, the study offers guidelines to stakeholders on the use of CSR 
reports from sin companies, and suggests the establishment of objective external CSR reports, 
overseen by accounting regulators. At the social level, the paper provides an overview of sin 
industries in society, and mitigating their harms. 
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This paper focuses on the interaction of the concept of legitimacy with corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), specifically CSR reporting. It shines a light on how CSR influences legitimacy in 
contexts where legitimacy is in doubt, namely, sin industries. 
 
Legitimacy of a company may be defined as “the perceived appropriateness of an organization to a 
social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and definitions” (Deephouse et al., 2017).  Although 
sin industry companies have a legal license to operate, they do not necessarily possess the social 
approval inherent in legitimacy to justify their potentially harmful products and services.  These are 
sectors whose activities are frowned upon by some or most of society, because they are perceived 
as making money from exploiting human weaknesses and frailties (Blitz & Fabozzi, 2017). The 
tobacco, gambling, alcohol, pornography and firearms industries are considered to be sin industries 
because they largely deviate from social, ethical and environmental standards in the way they make 
their profits, and it is argued that these firms are of dubious social value. Rather they are often the 
cause of physical, psychological, and social damage (Eurosif, 2012). Sin stocks sit on the opposite end 
of the spectrum from ethical investing, and are automatically excluded from socially responsible 
investment funds which comprise stocks from companies which excel on environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria.  
 
Thus, companies in sin industries have particular issues in the way they approach proving their 
legitimacy to ensure their continuity. CSR is often used as a means of attempting to convey their net 
contribution to society, to counter accusations made against them about their damaging activities. 
In short, CSR is used to prove an ongoing right to exist. Increasingly, companies, including those in 
sin industries are using regular CSR reports to enhance their legitimacy. However, in sin industries, 
there is a paradox in trying to present themselves as socially responsible when their core activities 
are generally perceived as harmful. They often claim CSR to present a socially responsible image 
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while their essential activities suggest otherwise. Inherent in this CSR presentation is an attempt to 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of salient stakeholders, who have the power to influence their right to 
exist, e.g., regulators (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
 
The framing of CSR reporting may try to present a generalized progressive image of how an 
enterprise is making a positive contribution to society, or is, at least, benign. In circumstances where 
a company is subject to accusations of wrongdoing of some kind, the CSR report may be a way of 
answering charges against it, or even admitting its offenses and apologizing and making reparations, 
in an attempt to purge its past and start afresh on a constructive note, one of the issues examined in 
the research. The external context in which the CSR report is written is important to understand to 
what extent and how company circumstances may influence the impression management 
attempted in a report, as compared with their actual behaviour and practices. 
 
The study also takes account of the fact that sin companies are allied to each other in attempts to 
neutralise antagonism toward the industry as a whole. At the same time, like any industry rivals, 
they are in competition with each other to receive favourable evaluations from all stakeholders. The 
multiple case study design, consisting of 10 sin industry companies in two industries, allows for the 
depth and understanding offered by qualitative research alongside some general insights derived 
from the cases, which may not be available from single case studies.  
 
This paper is one of the first studies to bring together legitimacy and CSR in companies in sin 
industries, recognising conflicting interests between their social effects and inherent activities. 
Legitimacy theory offers a theoretical explanatory underpinning to CSR in these companies. The 
study concentrates on the regulated tobacco and gambling industries in the UK where CSR reports 
and media stories about the activities and controversies involving the corporate sector are available. 
The empirical data for the research is drawn from the CSR reports of publicly listed companies, 
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sustainability information on the web page of unlisted companies, newspaper articles, and external 
organisational reports about the practices of the companies. The methodology employed is content 
analysis to decode the companies’ CSR statements and evaluate them alongside an analysis of their 
contemporaneous contextual issues and behaviour. 
 
Literature Review 
Sin industries have always been subjected to scrutiny and criticism. Nonetheless, there has been 
limited study of their organisational legitimacy, corporate strategies and techniques adopted to gain 
strategic legitimacy (Miller & Michelson, 2013; Reast et al., 2012), specifically via CSR.  
Legitimacy 
The application of legitimacy theory is pertinent in interpreting CSR behaviour in companies, and 
recently, the copious literature on the legitimacy concept has been reviewed and reframed 
(Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). The Deephouse et al. (2017) team examining 
legitimacy included Mark Suchman, the pioneering authority on legitimacy theory. The authors 
arrived at four basic states of organisational legitimacy – accepted, proper, debated, and 
illegitimate, thereby opting for legitimacy as a quasi-continuous concept. “Accepted” organizations 
are those whose legitimacy is assumed, taken for granted. “Proper” refers to organizations whose 
legitimacy has recently been evaluated and passed, but its legitimacy is not as embedded as 
accepted organizations. “Debated” legitimacy refers to instances of organisations whose 
stakeholders are in disagreement about its legitimacy, so there is some dispute about its activities 
and/or fundamental values. “Illegitimate” organisations are assessed as inappropriate by the social 
system, indicating they should be radically reformed or cease to exist altogether. 
 
The illegitimate category definition suggests why legitimacy matters, for a company’s very survival. 
Also, legitimacy may influence market access and the availability of strategic choices, and resulting 
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financial performance via stakeholder support or withholding. Tilling and Tilt (2010) refer to this as 
necessary resource flows to the organisation. They identify four key constituencies that control 
critical resources – the public, media, financial community, and the state.  Generally, the state, 
regulatory agencies, and licensing boards are significant. However, on an informal level, public 
opinion as a reflection of social values, and the media, with increasingly social media as possible 
formers of public opinion, are recognised as powerful in conferring or refusing legitimacy. In effect 
companies can influence the public policy process directly by addressing communal or regulatory 
concerns, or via projecting a socially desirable image (Patten, 1992).  Moreover, key stakeholders are 
not isolated, but actually influence each other, so, for example, public opinion pressures, influenced 
by media, may shape regulation. 
 
On what bases is legitimacy judged by stakeholders? There has been much previous debate about 
typologies of legitimacy (Reast et al., 2012; Suddaby et al., 2017). Deephouse et al. confirm four 
criteria to adjudicate on legitimacy – regulatory, pragmatic, moral, cultural-cognitive. They 
emphasise that the four types are not entirely discrete and independent of each other. For example, 
regulatory certification may rely on moral and cultural cognitive acceptance, alongside pragmatic 
elements when a company’s activities can be seen to make some practical contribution to society.  
 
Pragmatism entails a strategic approach from the perspective of the organisation seeking legitimacy, 
whereby legitimacy is a controllable variable and hence forms part of responsible reporting (Dowling 
& Pfeffer, 1975: Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). “Organisations seek to establish congruence between the 
social values associated with or implied by their activities/practices and the norms of acceptable 
behaviour in the larger social system of which they are a part” (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, p. 122). 
This congruence is variously described as fit, consistency, acceptance, cultural alignment, and 
normative support (Suddaby et al., 2017). When an organisation’s real or apparent behaviour 
conflicts with the social norms there occurs a “legitimacy gap” (Sethi, 1978).  
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Sin Industries and Legitimacy 
Sin industries are associated with “products, services or concepts that for reasons of delicacy, 
decency, morality, or even fear, elicit reactions of distaste, disgust, offence or outrage when 
mentioned or when openly presented” (Wilson and West, 1981, p. 92).  The legitimacy of sin 
industries is affected by cognitive beliefs about their companies and products (Galvin, et al., 2004). 
Laczniak and Murphy (2007) have strongly advocated the ethical obligations of these firms as their 
activities are likely to negatively impact consumers. According to Grougiou et al. (2016), sin 
industries are designated as core-stigmatised, “usually associated with deeply-rooted negative 
evaluations which require systematic strategies to minimize their impact” (p. 906). This type of 
stigma is considered to be of a permanent nature, because of the fundamental outputs, routines, 
actions and operations of these companies. 
 
Thus, sin industry companies have particular issues in establishing legitimacy. Suchman’s (1995) 
tripartite gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimation challenges would seem to be pertinent to 
sin industry companies. It is debatable whether these companies ever gain real legitimacy in any 
deep-seated sense that fulfills all four regulatory, pragmatic, moral and cultural-cognitive criteria, as 
there is a mistrust about them, even if they are legally licensed. Thus, legitimacy is always precarious 
with respect to its maintenance. There are constant attempts by various stakeholders to curtail the 
activities of sin companies. Examples are the imposition of plain packaging for tobacco products or 
restricting gambling advertising. There is often a struggle between the authorities controlling sin 
companies and sin companies finding ways of resisting any further regulatory restrictions, and 
indeed, loosening existing limitations. The issue for companies is to find an appropriate response, 
depending on the type of challenge and who are the key stakeholders, according to Deephouse et al. 
(2017). With sin industries, challenges arising from rule breaking and scandals are often seen by key 
stakeholders as moral or cultural-cognitive transgressions. These are difficult to counter with 
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pragmatic responses, which may be the easiest ones to effect. The unstable state of legitimacy in sin 
companies emphasises legitimation as an ongoing process, since organisations, stakeholders and 
criteria may change over time (Kuruppu et al., 2019; Suddaby et al., 2017).   
 
Sin Industries and Corporate Social Responsibility 
A growing trend is for sin industry companies to attempt to shore up their legitimacy through 
publicising their CSR credentials.  This is consistent with Brown and Dacin’s (1997) view that the 
principal purpose of CSR in a company is to illustrate its status and activities with respect to its 
perceived societal and stakeholder obligations. Similarly, Carroll (1999) concluded that CSR 
addresses and captures the most important concerns of the public regarding business and society 
relationships. Generally, research has continuously established the positive relation between firm 
goodwill and value with their sustainability policy (Cai et al., 2012). 
 
Significantly for sin companies, Key and Popkin (1998) observed that regulation comes from social 
and ethical concerns of stakeholders, so publicising CSR activities should benefit the  businesses. The 
attitude of sin companies towards CSR has been described as, “a useful portmanteau description for 
a well-considered present-day business response to suspicion pressures and attacks” (Henderson, 
2001. p.146). Thus, organisations advertise their engagement in CSR, which may be employed as a 
shield for questionable behaviour (Banerjee, 2008). 
Impression management is a key part of CSR activities for sin companies, due to a heightened level 
of scrutiny by multiple stakeholders. One way of making positive impressions to a broad array of 
stakeholders is via CSR reporting, since communication for collective meaning making is an inherent 
part of legitimation, which is dependent on persuasion and influence grounded in language 
(Suddaby et al., 2017). Such reporting is also a way of countering negative publicity from media and 
others (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). 
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It has been observed that many companies utilise voluntary sustainability reporting as façades for 
hypocrisy regarding actual behaviour, to placate different stakeholders (Cho et al., 2015). In essence, 
there is a disconnect between self-reports and real impact (Buhr et al., 2014). This is especially so in 
the ecological sphere in environmentally sensitive industries (Wiseman, 1982; Milne & Gray, 2013). 
Moreover, attempts to integrate annual reports of companies so they combine sustainability or ESG 
reports as part of the report merely subordinates the ESG reports to the conventional annual 
financial statements. 
While all firms use CSR reporting to attract and retain vital stakeholder support, and, in some 
instances to produce a façade of corporate responsibility, Grougiou et al. (2016) find that sin 
industry companies are significantly more likely than matched non-sin companies to issue stand-
alone CSR reports. These reports are geared to signal conformity, to generate an image of being a 
normal mainstream company, just like any other. CSR reporting constitutes a systematic ongoing 
and unceasing method of countering the core-stigma of sin companies. The apparent normality also 
has the effect of legitimising the consumption of their products as an ordinary activity, so absolving 
their consumers from any stigma attaching to the use of their products or services. 
Palazzo and Richter (2005) developed a CSR framework for the tobacco industry.  They argue that 
although the tobacco companies practice sustainability, this CSR engagement is to distract 
consumers from the harmful impact of their business. They concluded that the marketing activities 
of the tobacco companies ultimately attract non-smokers, mostly youngsters. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO, 2008) in their study of the tobacco industry has described social responsibility in 
this industry as an intrinsic contradiction. WHO has concluded that despite companies’ claims of 
sustainability, they continue using irresponsible and unethical strategies to increase their profits.  
Research in gambling has focussed on its cause of addictive problem gambling. Studies have 
attempted to measure the cost society bears from gambling (Henriksson, 2001). Grinols and 
Mustard (2001) calculated these social costs as being 1.9 times higher than the social benefits. More 
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recently, the dangers of online gambling and its easy accessibility have come to the fore (Griffiths et 
al., 2009; Monaghan, 2009). 
The major gambling companies in the UK practice CSR reporting (Jones et al., 2009). Self-exclusion, 
deposit limits (Soriano et al., 2012), training of staff in CSR (Pratten & Walton, 2009) and other such 
“sustainability” procedures have been mentioned in the UK gambling industry. Miller and Michelson 
(2012) highlight that gambling is considered an ethically and morally wrong activity. Hence it is 
difficult to regard the CSR practices of such companies as legitimate. Thus, the adoption and use of 
CSR in the gambling industry is likely to draw criticism and challenges by its opponents. Reast, et al. 
(2012) conducted a case study on the failure of a supercasino project to examine the different 
strategies which the UK gambling industry employs to justify its legitimacy. The results suggested 
that these gambling firms engage in efforts like CSR initiatives and “responsible gambling” 
programmes to gain social legitimacy, attempting to ensure their long-term viability. 
 
The controversial industries have not found prominence in CSR research. The sin industries of 
tobacco and gambling have received some attention separately regarding legitimacy or CSR, 
frequently based on single case studies, but these studies have not investigated the interaction of 
legitimacy theory with CSR reporting and actual practice in these industries. This was the purpose of 
this research. 
 
How do sin industries attempt to use CSR to justify their social legitimacy? Prior research has 
established that CSR reporting is a way to publicise their various activities and professed 
achievements in the social responsibility sphere, to prove legitimacy via undertakings such as 
corporate philanthropy, stakeholder collaboration, and environmental sustainability. (Grougiou et 
al., 2016). These are aimed to prove the validity of self-regulation to key direct and indirect 
stakeholders, especially the four key constituencies that control critical resources – the public, 
media, financial community, and the state (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). 
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The following model delineates how legitimacy seeking occurs via CSR reporting: 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 1 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Since CSR reporting is so important in the strategies of sin companies, this study investigates how 
selected sin industries enact their legitimacy seeking according to the proposed model by analysing 
the content of their reports. 
   
Methodology  
 
The study consisted of content analysis of the CSR reporting of 10 UK based companies – 3 tobacco 
companies and 7 gambling companies. 
 
There are three UK tobacco companies, British American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Tobacco plc and 
Gallaher Ltd which was acquired by Japan Tobacco International (JTI) in 2007. The tobacco market in 
the UK is dominated by Imperial Tobacco and JTI which together comprised 84 percent of the 
market with BAT at 8 percent. UK tobacco sales have been in decline since 1974 after a high point. 
However, the profits of this industry have increased over recent years despite declining sales 
because regular price increases on cigarettes have outpaced people’s ability to give up smoking. In 
fact, BAT reported increased first half revenues for 2020 despite the COVID-19 pandemic, as 
government unemployment support gave smokers money, so they were not forced to switch to 
cheaper brands, smoke less or quit (Nilsson, 2020). According to an analysis, the cost of smoking to 
the economy was £11 billion a year in 2017. In that year, £9.5 billion was generated in excise duty 
from tobacco products in the UK, leaving a deficit of approximately £1.5 billion (ASH Action on 
Smoking and Health, 2017). 
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However, the major tobacco companies operating in the UK are not paying corporation tax at the 
rate they should, as they have reorganized corporate structures to enable profits to be shifted 
overseas, resulting in significantly more in corporation tax overseas than domestically. Branston and 
Gilmore (2019), whose research revealed these tax discrepancies, call for a special levy on tobacco 
companies, similar to a surcharge imposed on banks to compensate for their costs to the country in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The researchers also recommend mandated country-by-country 
reporting on tobacco sales and profits. 
 
Tobacco companies have been trying to offset declines in traditional cigarettes with new products, 
such as vaping and heated tobacco devices, but sales of these have actually been in decline. 
Moreover, their safety has been questioned by authorities. Thus, tobacco companies remain reliant 
on conventional cigarettes.    
 
The tobacco industry adopted CSR strategies and reporting around the 1990s, attempting to foster a 
good reputation and influence the policy makers from regulating tobacco consumption, although 
tobacco is acknowledged as a leading cause for preventable deaths in the world. As tobacco 
companies are not permitted by law to promote or advertise their products and services directly, 
CSR reporting may be regarded as an alternative (World Health Organisation, 2008; 2009). 
 
The second sin industry in the study includes 7 gambling companies encompassing betting shops and 
online gambling activities. These are William Hill, Ladbrokes, Gala Coral Group, Betfred, Paddy 
Power, Playtech and Betfair. The industry saw two mergers in 2016, between Ladbrokes and Gala 
Coral Group and between Betfair and Paddy Power.  
 
The Gambling Commission, established to regulate the industry in 2005, aims to protect vulnerable 
persons and monitor the rising Internet gambling sector. The Gambling Act of 2005 opened the door 
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to TV advertising for sports betting, online casinos and poker, giving betting companies direct access 
to people’s homes. It is alleged that the Act made the UK one of the most deregulated in the world 
(Ford, 2019). The industry’s income, along with the amount of tax it pays to the Treasury, has soared 
since, according to data from the Gambling Commission. Gross gambling yield – the amount 
gambling firms win from customers – was £8.36 billion in the year beginning April 2008. Gambling 
revenues climbed almost 70 percent to reach a record £14.5 billion in the year to September 2018. 
Income from so-called remote betting – such as online casinos, poker and bingo – was £817 million 
in 2009 but reached £5.6 billion in 2018, making up 39 percent of the industry (Gambling 
Commission, 2019). The amount British gamblers lost on fixed-odds betting terminals (FOBTs) which 
are electronic gaming machines in betting shops, increased by 74 percent between 2009 and 2017, 
from £1 billion to £1.8 billion, despite the number of machines rising by just 9 percent over the same 
period, indicating people were losing ever larger sums.  
 
The gambling industry is a major player in the UK economy by contributing almost £2.9 billion via 
betting, gaming and lottery duty in fiscal 2017/18. This kind of public income can have the effect of 
slowing anti-gambling legislation (Hancock et al. 2008). However, a study by the charity 
GambleAware and the think-tank Institute for Public Policy Research found that problem gambling 
could be costing the UK economy £1.2 billion per year (IPPR, 2016). Gambling advertisements also 
contribute to media income whilst sports sponsorship also gives sports teams incentives to engage 
positively with the industry because of critical income provided by the gambling companies.  
 
This industry has always been associated with negative social effects, mainly problem gambling. In a 
NatCen Social Research report (2017) prepared for the Gambling Commission, it was found that in 
2016, the number of adult problem gamblers in Great Britain was approximately 340,000, while the 
estimation of potential problem gamblers is even higher at up to 460,000. Of course, there are 
serious knock-on harms on family members of problem gamblers.  The NatCen Social Research 
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report asserts that “much remains to be done if harms from gambling are to be reduced”. The 
industry faced multiple regulations, such as a rise from 15 percent to 21 percent in remote gaming 
taxes in 2018 and the 2019 lowering of the betting ceiling on FOBTs to £2 from its previous £100.  
 
Further, in 2020, after a year-long inquiry, a 50 strong All Party Parliamentary Group for Gambling 
Related Harm (GRH APPG), recommended new more restrictive gambling legislation with respect to 
advertising and marketing, tax avoidance, and the imposition of levies to support consumer redress. 
The Group emphasised that its drastic measures carry public support and that it was necessitated by 
the fact that gambling companies had resisted change at every turn and could not be trusted to self-
regulate. Then, in 2021, a review of the 2005 Gambling Act to bring it into the digital age was 
expected to result in advertising curbs, severe stake limits and bans on sports sponsorship. Also, a 
think-tank report predicted that if gambling spending fell by 10 percent, the economy would derive 
net benefits because more would be spent by consumers in productive sectors with longer supply 
chains, and generating more taxes, along with the creation of 24000 jobs. 
 
Content Analysis 
The method employed for this study was content analysis. Content analysis has been defined as “a 
technique for gathering data that consists of codifying qualitative information in anecdotal and 
literary form into categories in order to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity” 
(Abbot and Monsen, 1979, p. 504). It can be used to understand social and environmental 
disclosures, as it helps to make valid inferences by coding and interpreting textual data, thus 
transforming qualitative material to quantitative form. The validity and authenticity of the study is 
increased by an analytic procedure like a coding scheme. Two distinct approaches of content 
analysis, conventional and summative, were employed. Conventional content analysis derives coding 
categories directly from text. Summative content analysis identifies and quantifies words or content 
in the text for comparisons and interpretation of underlying context. The conventional content 
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analysis helps to negate preconceived and theoretical categories as it is based on actual text, 
thereby facilitating the emergence of new insights and categories to stem directly from data rather 
than preconceived categories (Kondracki & Wellman, 2002). The summative analysis provides useful 
insights into how words are used. It goes beyond word counts to include latent content analysis. 
(Holsti, 1969). There are several advantages of a summative content analysis, as it provides basic 
insights into the usage of words.  If the results are consistent with the interpretation, it 
demonstrates credibility. 
 
The CSR reports, or the relevant section of annual reports of the 10 companies where companies do 
not publish separate CSR reports, were analysed. The sources for CSR reports were Corporate Social 
Responsibility Newswire, CorporateRegister.com, Ethic Scan, Research Gate and company websites.  
For an effective comparison between the companies, the Chief Executive Officer’s statement was 
selected for analysis. The CEO is the voice of the company and represents its public face.  He (all 
CEOs in the study were male) makes various claims of engagement and achievements in CSR 
activities and thus, his statement is the company’s justification of sustainability and legitimacy. 
 
The first step in conventional content analysis was to read the text of the CSR reports and CEO 
statements, word-by-word to derive possible themes, officially known as nodes. The initial labels for 
the nodes were developed from the opening analysis and the process continued until a coding 
scheme was developed. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards for reporting on a range of 
economic, environmental and social impacts were invoked as guides to frame the nodes (GRI 
Standards). Fifteen nodes which are representative of the standard and necessary elements in a CSR 
report, were developed. The nodes covered the interests of consumers, employees and stakeholders 
of the company. They assess company attitude, challenges faced, CSR strategies, past achievements 
and future goals.  
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For the summative content analysis, a word frequency was run on NVivo Pro. This test showed the 
most frequent words in the company report,  indicating the image that the company wants to 
project by using them multiple times to attract attention. The relative frequencies of the words also 
offer insights into corporate priorities. These analyses should give a detailed picture of the 
company’s CSR policy and actions in order to assess their attempts to justify their legitimacy. 
 
As it is proposed that companies frame their reports to prove their legitimacy in response to public 
concerns, the company reports analysis is then compared with actual context and behaviour of the 
companies. Past studies have found media accounts useful as reflecting extant issues in public 
discourse (Suddaby et al., 2017). Therefore, context is described by means of media coverage of the 




The content analysis found 15 nodes in the companies’ CSR reports. The nodes are: 
• Actions and Steps taken - This node describes CSR/sustainability activities undertaken by the 
company. 
• Attitude towards CSR - This node highlights a positive attitude portraying the beliefs of the 
company in CSR ideas and practices. 
• Attitude to Technology - Adopting advanced and eco-friendly technology is portrayed as important 
in a company’s efforts toward CSR. This node refers to any such technological references in the 
analysed report. 
• Awards and Accreditation - This node shows the awards, credits and recognition that the company 
has received for its CSR activities. 
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• Background Information - This node is for any general background information about the company 
provided in the report.  
• Challenges Faced - This node is further divided into sub-nodes of economic, environmental, 
operational and socio-cultural challenges which the company has faced or is facing in 
implementing better, ethical practices and methods of business. 
• Consumer Orientation - This node refers to policies emphasising the importance and constructive 
attitude of the company towards its consumers. 
• CSR Strategy - This node highlights the CSR programme of the company, depicting its strategy 
outline and working scheme.  
• Employee Orientation - This node picks up references for the progress and development of 
employee well-being as important stakeholders of the company. 
• Failures and Self-criticism - This node refers to any acknowledgments by the company of its flaws 
and failures as a CSR actor. 
• Governmental and other Organisational References - In terms of CSR, many policies and initiatives 
come from the Government as well as independent organisations, such as NGOs. This node refers 
to compliance or even alliances of the company with such entities. 
• Past Achievements - This node highlights any previous achievements of CSR goals and sustainable 
actions. 
• Set Standards and Values - This node refers to statements of standards, beliefs, values and rules by 
which the company aims to abide in all its programmes and strategies. 
• Stakeholder orientation - This node points out the attitude and orientation of company goals 
towards its stakeholders as important interest-holders in a company. 
• Sustainability goals - This node denotes the sustainability goals of the company. 
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Table 1 shows the coding scheme for the 15 nodes of the three tobacco companies. The top 5 nodes, 
based on the number of references, have been highlighted in red for each company. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 2 shows the coding scheme developed from analysing the CSR reports of the gambling 
companies with the top 5 nodes based on the number of references for each company highlighted in 
red. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the word frequency count in the CSR report for the tobacco companies. 
The 10 most frequent words are presented in the Table. The count denotes the frequency of the 
word and the weighted percentage calculated for the word with respect to the other words in the 
text, expressing the importance of that particular word in the entire report. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 shows the results of the word frequency count in the CSR report of the gambling companies, 
with the frequency and weighted percentage of the 10 most frequent words for each company. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Analysis of Results 
Tobacco Companies 
On analysing the results, similar trends can be noticed in the claims of the three tobacco companies.  
The common highlight of their reports shows their attitude to CSR, portrayed in a positive light. 
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Primary importance has been given to the CSR strategy adopted by the companies, their 
sustainability goals and finally the actions and steps taken by them to reduce the harmful impact of 
their products, to practice responsible marketing and be part of industry initiatives. These topics 
paint a constructive picture of the companies portraying them to be responsible and concerned. 
However, the companies’ CSR reports have been less attentive in their approach to customers, 
employees or other stakeholders with only JTI outlining sustainable schemes for employee benefits.  
 
By-and-large, mention of challenges is negligible, with the exception of BAT which describes 
operational challenges that they encounter, like a high level of illegal tobacco. These are challenges 
for which the company is not depicted as a perpetrator. It can be argued that this concern does not 
reflect CSR, but it is rather a worry about potential lost income. Imperial and JTI have focused more 
on their set standards and values of responsibility and emphasised their efforts and achievements in 
CSR to project a more socially legitimate image. The omission of health threats of tobacco in annual 
reports is consistent with Tilling and Tilt’s (2010) study of Rothman Tobacco’s annual reports over a 
24-year period. 
  
The word frequency test shows the most common words used by the companies to influence the 
reader by resounding those words. BAT has used mostly serious words like “business”, “corporate”, 
“tobacco”, “executive”, words that seem most directed to investors about strategy and pragmatism . 
Peripheral importance has been given to rural welfare schemes for “agriculture” and  the “farmer”. 
Imperial Tobacco and JTI are on similar tracks with respect to strategy and investor-oriented words. 
In addition, they have repeatedly used words such as “sustainability”, “responsible”, “natural”, 




In checking the context for their CSR disclosures, in reality, these companies have been subjected to 
criticism and even prosecution for their business practices, some of which were proven to be illegal. 
BAT has faced the largest number of allegations. It tried to use endowments to prestigious 
universities to enhance its reputation. It made an offer to a London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine student of a £1500 grant and work experience which was rejected by the School (Meikle, 
2002).  In 2011, Durham University was condemned for accepting a £125,000 grant from BAT toward 
an Education for Afghan Women Appeal (Tobin, 2011). In its Annual General Meeting in 2007, BAT 
was accused of objectionable marketing tactics. Advertisements proved that BAT was selling loose 
cigarettes rather than in a pack, a practice illegal in the UK since 1991, as it made cigarettes easier to 
buy (ASH, 2007).  It was also reported that BAT was using marketing that glamorises smoking to 
attract young people, a breach of the UK Tobacco Advertising Act 2002. The most cynical attempt by 
BAT was to sponsor public health initiatives. BAT engaged in a Blindness Relief programme in 
Bangladesh, by making large donations and generating publicity (World Health Organization, 2004). 
Meanwhile, smoking remains a major cause of cataracts which cause blindness. Latterly, BAT was 
facing investigation by the US Department of Justice, for bribing policymakers in Africa to cover up 
allegations of environmental damage in Uganda and corporate espionage in Kenya, violations which 
could result in prison for the Company’s executives (Doward, 2016). 
 
In 2000, there was evidence that Imperial Tobacco was involved in smuggling and export of UK-made 
cigarettes, to be brought back into the UK black market (ASH, 2002).This greatly enhanced its 
commercial success. Interestingly, Imperial Tobacco dropped the word “tobacco” from its name to 
gain credibility and enhance its image, renaming itself Imperial Brands PLC in 2016 (Martin, 2015). 
This is in clear contrast to the fact that it generated more than £25 billion from tobacco products in 
2015. Similarly, Japan Tobacco International also eliminated the word ‘tobacco’ from its designation 
and now calls itself JTI. 
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Tobacco advertising and sponsorship of sport has been banned, but companies continue to sponsor 
respectable organisations to appear socially responsible. BAT is a sponsor of the Marie Curie cancer 
charity and Bloomberg. Ironically, Michael Bloomberg has a strong public stand against tobacco. 
Healthcare professionals have protested against such sponsorship as morally unacceptable. On the 
cultural front, JTI has been a leading sponsor of the Royal Academy London, although other UK 
galleries and museums have declined donations from tobacco companies (The Guardian, 2016). 
 
JTI provided hospitality worth thousands of pounds to six Members of Parliament (MPs) in attempts 
to drop regulation for plain cigarette packaging. Previously, JTI spent £23,000 entertaining 20 MPs in 
six months, and subsequently, almost half of them voted against a bill that aims to ban smoking in 
cars (Hastings, 2012). All three tobacco companies challenged the lawfulness of the government’s 
new plain packaging regulation banning logos or branding on tobacco products in 2015, but they 
later lost a High Court battle on the matter (Boseley, 2016). 
 
Having met only limited success with alternative products, tobacco companies have reverted to 
targeting more dependable traditional cigarettes, a strategy promoted by the new CEO of Imperial 
(Nilsson, 2021). Meanwhile, BAT faced a backlash by pressing ahead with a 9.5 percent pay increase 
for its CEO, even as many top executives were taking pay cuts or forfeitures in the face of the COVID-
19 pandemic, whilst the company was the subject of a US criminal inquiry into sanctions-busting 
(Kleinman, 2020). Tobacco companies cannot be indifferent to increasing pressure on the industry, 
by the US administration’s plans to strip cigarettes of nicotine and banning menthol products 
(Nilsson, 2021a). Moreover, New Zealand is pursuing a Smokefree 2025 goal (Edwards et al., 2021).   
 
Gambling Companies 
The coding results for the gambling companies show mostly common trends in presenting CSR as a 
strategic business policy. Each of these companies have discussed in depth the actions and steps 
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that they have taken to fulfil their social obligations and have carefully outlined their CSR strategy to 
appear sincere and rational. Gala Coral refers to its progressive attitude to technology, adopting 
advanced tools for consumer protection and to monitor betting activities. Training, equality and 
welfare policies for employees have formed a significant part of all company reports, but Gala Coral 
Group and Betfred have chosen to focus relatively more on a consumer orientation. The other 
stakeholders of the gambling companies have found no mention.  William Hill and Ladbrokes depict 
commitment through their goals of responsible gambling, self-exclusion techniques, reducing 
problem gambling and community initiatives.  Four of the companies, William Hill, Ladbrokes, Betfair 
and Paddy Power have expounded on their past achievements in the fields of responsible 
advertising, detection of problem gamblers and control of high stakes. Paddy Power, Playtech and 
Betfair report CSR activities whereby they are part of gambling protection groups and have 
contributed to charities. Significantly, none of the companies have admitted to any failures or 
challenges faced, despite well-known obstacles that gambling must overcome by way of operational, 
economic and social challenges to legitimacy.  Nonetheless, the companies have omitted any 
difficulties or negativity in their reports, thereby presenting an unequivocally affirmative CSR 
attitude, similar to the tobacco industry. 
 
The word frequency test reinforces the image that the companies project in their CSR reports, using 
CSR as a strategic modus operandi. William Hill has continuously used ‘gambling’, “responsible” and 
“community”, attempting to project a responsible attitude to gambling and situating themselves as 
an inherent part of their society. Ladbrokes and Gala Coral Group have repeatedly used “gambling”, 
“business”, “responsible”, “betting” to put across their constructive approach in controlling their 
betting function.  Gala Coral emphasises “integrity”. Betfred conveys its emphasis on “staff” and 
“customers” to prevent illegal “age” gambling and “crime”. Paddy Power has concentrated on 
promoting “paddy”, “power” as a “responsible”, “business”. Playtech has described itself as part of 
the “group”, “industry” and about its “licensees” and “employees”. Betfair highlights issues like 
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“health”, “charity”, “safety” and “responsibility” in its report. This is consistent with the claim that 
the notion of “responsible gambling” locates the problem in the individual gambler, not the product 
(Ford, 2019), placing the industry as helper rather than harmer.   
 
As with the tobacco companies, if one examines the context in which the gambling companies 
operate, the denunciations, scandals and accusations against them are at considerable variance with 
the messages they attempt to convey in their reporting.  
 
Research on marketing in gambling between 2014 and 2018, mainly in Australia and the UK showed 
that gambling marketing is highly targeted, especially around sport, with the most popular strategies 
being increasing brand awareness, advertising complex financial incentives and betting odds for 
participation. Perceptions of gambling advertising, particularly among vulnerable groups (e.g. 
children, problem gamblers) appear to be influenced by this targeted content. Emerging research 
suggests that exposure to gambling marketing is associated with more frequent and riskier gambling 
behaviour (Newall et al., 2019).  As problem gambling increases, William Hill has been sued for more 
than £2 million by a man who lost his career and family to his gambling addiction. After he opted for 
self-exclusion, the company allowed him to start betting again, which led to a single, huge bet loss 
(BBC, 2008). Sports sponsorships by gambling companies have frequently been condemned. For 
example, Andy Murray, a leading tennis player, has criticized William Hill for being the official 
sponsor of the Australian Open Tennis tournament. This is highly relevant as tennis faces match-
fixing inquiries (McLeman, 2016). 
  
The gambling companies have been implicated in multiple cases of money laundering, fraud and 
cyber-theft. For instance, Gala Coral Group, on directive of the Gambling Commission had to pay 
restitution of £880,000 for failure to prevent money laundering and problem gambling. It did not 
stop a VIP customer from losing money which turned out to be illicit funds (Beckett, 2016). Gala 
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Coral has repeatedly failed tests against its claims of staff training, innovative tools and anti-money 
laundering team. Paddy Power was forced to pay out  £280,000, having been found guilty of 
encouraging a problem gambler to continue betting until he lost his home, job and access to his 
children (Davies, 2016). Following outrage and complaints, Paddy Power was reprimanded by the 
Advertising Standards Authority in the UK to remove its advertisement offering wagers on the 
outcome of the Oscar Pistorius high profile murder trial in South Africa. It was believed that the ad 
trivialized issues surrounding the trial, the death of a woman, and disability, and ads of this kind can 
inspire further similar offences (The Journal.ie, 2014). Paddy Power has faced bans for several 
tasteless advertisements like betting on two old ladies crossing the road, and a depiction of Jesus 
gambling during the Last Supper (Paddy Power’s 10 most controversial adverts, 2012). Ironically, 
these notorious advertisements act as publicity stunts to highlight Paddy Power’s profile. 
 
Betting shops were estimated to make almost £34 million weekly from FOBTs, designated as 
destructive as ‘crack cocaine’ (Gentleman, 2013).  These betting terminals are concentrated in poor 
neighbourhoods, and are emblematic of high levels of addiction and antisocial behaviour. The outcry 
about the harm caused by betting terminals began a movement to limit their use, culminating in 
legislation to reduce the maximum bet on them from £100 to £2 from April 2019, notwithstanding 
lobbying by the gambling industry, including commissioning a report from KPMG warning about the 
cost in jobs losses and the damage to the industry with the closure of about a fifth of betting shops 
and costing the Treasury £1 billion by 2020 (BBC News, 2018). The Association of British Bookmakers 
(ABB) has denied that there is a link between FOBTs and problem gambling, but a report by the 
Gambling Commission (2019) found that 11.5 percent of the people who use machines in 
bookmakers are problem gamblers, up from 7.2 percent in 2012. The same report claimed that the 
number of problem gamblers in the UK was stable, something the Commission said was true 
“statistically”. However, two comparable surveys from the Commission indicate the number of 
24 
problem gamblers – defined as “having a habit to a degree that compromises, disrupts or damages 
family, personal or recreational pursuits” – rose between 2012 and 2015 (NatCen, 2018, p.1).  
 
One of the tools available to anyone seeking help is “self-exclusion”, industry schemes that allow 
gamblers to opt out of betting, supposedly irreversibly, for an agreed period. Between 2009 and 
2016, the number of self-exclusions tripled from 11,424 to 34,091, according to the Gambling 
Commission. But the number of reported self-exclusion breaches – occasions when the system did 
not work – more than quadrupled from 4,033 to 18,784, as betting companies continued to target 
excluded gamblers (Davies, 2017). 
 
Other adverse news against gambling companies reported that members of an influential 
Parliamentary committee received more than £10,000 in benefits from Ladbrokes and Betfred to 
oppose stricter regulation (Ramesh, 2016). Several charities, notably the Young Gamblers Education 
Trust, funded by Paddy Power, Gala Coral Group and Bet365, have gambling executives on their 
boards. Such activities are listed as positive CSR contributions by these companies, but could be 
regarded as façades. Betfred has committed violations by failures to take measures against money 
laundering, resulting in fines of £322,000 in 2019 and £800,000 in 2016 (Burn, 2019; Davies, 2016). 
 
Betfair has one of the highest levels of allegations against it of all the gambling companies in the 
study, even as it uses the language of social responsibility in its reports. The Company offered casino 
“bonuses” to its customers for a window of three hours in which they could deposit £200 as many 
times as they wished and receive a 50 percent bonus on it. However, on losing big money to its 
customers, Betfair accused them of irregular activity and confiscated their earnings. (Betfair casino 
scam, 2010). In a similar incident, Betfair denied payment to its players after it had mistakenly 
proclaimed an offer. An enticing and thrilling Betfair advertisement once led a man to gamble away 
£750,000 along with his family, whom he lost in the process (Jarvis, 2013). 
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The media has a lot to lose from any clampdown on the gambling industry. Sport, in particular 
football, also has something to gain from a thriving gambling industry, which provides a large slice of 
sponsorship income. 
 
UK gambling companies have dealt with threats of increasing restrictions, and the closure of betting 
shops during the COVID-19 pandemic by industry consolidation, concentrating on online betting and 
establishing themselves in more favourable regulatory environments. Paddy Power acquired Betfair 
to become Flutter. The merger of Ladbrokes and Coral was then acquired by Gala to become Entain. 
The easing of gambling restrictions in many US states has attracted these UK companies to that 
market, along with William Hill, acquired by Caesar’s Entertainment. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This research studies a unique combination of legitimacy, sin industries and CSR via CSR reports. It 
concludes that there is an ongoing tension between the business of sin industry companies and their 
attempts to establish and maintain some kind of legitimacy, using CSR reporting in particular ways to 
try to prove their credentials to society. The findings of the study are interpreted through the 
conceptual framework of legitimacy. 
 
Having defined legitimacy as the extent to which an organisation is appropriate within a social 
system, there are four basic evaluations. The most desirable, “accepted” and even the next one 
down, “proper” are evidently not applicable to any of the sin companies in this study, which are 
regarded as core-stigmatised, albeit they are legally established. In fact, their legal status is always 
under threat of ever tightening restrictions. At best, they fall into the “debated” category, since the 
damage they cause invites constant scrutiny, as seen in the contextual material in the study. At 
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times, especially when prosecuted for criminal wrongdoing, they are regarded as illegitimate. 
Among various stakeholders, they are always regarded as illegitimate. This is the base from which 
sin companies conduct their CSR activities and reporting.  
 
Sin companies require even a low level of legitimacy, to curtail any further restrictive regulation and 
higher taxes, to continue to operate and obtain financial income. The findings demonstrate that they 
use CSR communications to engage stakeholder support and give themselves the scope for strategic 
choice to enable survival and financial flourishing. In the UK, the sin companies have succeeded in 
staying in business and indeed, with healthy profitability and share prices, notwithstanding their 
many well publicised apparently irresponsible and sometimes illegal actions. 
 
The study shows that legitimacy seeking through CSR reporting is best conceived as “legitimacy-as-
perception”, whereby the companies are attempting to influence particular “evaluators” to observe 
and judge them favourably with respect to legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017).   
  
The key stakeholders of sin companies are regulators and consumers. However, in the background is 
public opinion, influenced by community organisations, NGOs and media. The latter are important 
for sin companies as ways of gaining and maintaining unfettered access to consumers and 
favourably persuade the authorities to leave them to their business without interference. However, 
there may be times when sin companies require more active support, for example, when seeking 
permission for expansion (Reast et al., 2013). With respect to media, the gambling industry offers a 
significant revenue stream through its large advertising budgets, so this may help to promulgate 
favourable information about sin companies’ CSR activities. Meanwhile, sin industries are an 
important source of taxation for governments, as seen when sin companies try to persuade 
politicians and officials of their contribution to the public, while ignoring the net costs to society.  
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Table 5 displays how the sin companies attempt to gain legitimacy in their CSR reports, and 
alongside, their actual actions, most of which do not appear in their CSR reports, seen through 
regulatory, pragmatic, moral, and cultural/cognitive lenses as criteria for legitimacy. The tobacco 
industry is in a more precarious existential position than gambling. However, there is a remarkable 
similarity between both industries with respect to legitimacy seeking in CSR reports, as against 
actual behaviour, suggesting that the findings are generalisable across sin industries. In fact, there is 
no hint of any ‘mea culpa’ when controversial items appear in CSR reports. Instead, they take the 
form of blaming the other and/or casting themselves as victims, as BAT did, complaining about 
operational challenges around illegal tobacco marketing by others. In similar vein, the gambling 
industry places the blame for problem gambling on the individual gambler, whom the industry is 
only trying to help to overcome his/her addiction, ignoring the role that the industry has played in 
creating the problem in the first place.   
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In their positivity, the CSR reports emphasise mainly the pragmatic criteria of legitimacy, as can be 
seen by the nodes that emerged, and the word content analysis. Overall, business-as-usual 
impression management pervades, with the presentation of business strategy and supporting 
activities.  These pertain especially to practical actions taken with respect to philanthropy, 
community, leisure, and training programmes, and purported addiction prevention and alleviation 
measures, akin to the strategic façade corporate disclosure strategies adopted by casinos in Macau 
(Leung and Snell, 2021). This attitude in furnishing CSR reports as subservient to overall financial 
reporting to maintain the status quo business model is consistent with the assertions of Gray (2006) 
in his overview of social and environmental reporting. Our study has shown the inconsistency 
between actual behaviour and CSR reports by sin companies. In this respect, external objective CSR 
reports on companies’ CSR performance, verified by third parties, would be more useful for 
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stakeholders in getting a true picture of actual conduct. A promising universal standard in this regard 
is a call by the chief executives of the UN grouping, Global Investors for Sustainable Development, to 
push the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) to establish global ESG disclosure standards, endorsed by Barker et al. (2020). 
 
Some of the actions also have a cultural/cognitive dimension, as listed in Table 5, although attaining 
cognitive legitimacy could be problematic for sin companies, since it assumes that the focal 
organisation and its business is an inherent and necessary part-and-parcel of the social/public 
ecosystem (Reast et al., 2012). This is geared to demonstrate the benefits that the companies confer 
on relevant stakeholders whose approval they require (Patten, 1992). It would be an almost 
impossible task for sin companies to claim normative legitimacy, which requires intertwining moral 
standards and salient stakeholders’ value systems. However, it is possible that their regulatory and 
pragmatic legitimacy, if attained through CSR, can be leveraged to achieve cognitive and normative 
legitimacy at a later stage in a circumscribed way. For example, successful community sports 
schemes sponsored by a sin company may become an intrinsic part of civic life in a locality. 
 
The content of the sin companies’ CSR reports shies away from negativity, concentrating almost 
entirely on their good deeds and contributions, for example, by supporting charities or supposedly 
helping their consumers to avoid addictions. Such minimal narrative disclosure entails the absence 
of bad news which might otherwise engage the attention of the reader. The findings are consistent 
with those of O’Donovan (2002) who found that environmental disclosures in annual reports were 
geared to portray a positive picture of a corporation’s social and environmental performance – in 
short, a public relations document. 
 
It is argued that a balanced report should deliberate the failures and challenges that a company 
faces (Global Reporting Initiative, 2015). However, for sin companies, avoidance of controversial 
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issues arising from their activities in their CSR reports may be a better way of staying under the 
radar. This is supported by research conducted by Campbell et al. (2003) who found that companies 
in industries with an apparently greater legitimacy gap disclosed less than those in industries with 
lesser gaps. In fact, paradoxically, in a study of major oil spills, it was found that the media is less 
likely to cover repeat offenders who cause larger spills. It is concluded that errors that conform to an 
established pattern are more likely to be ignored than new offences which are copiously reported. 
This suggests that the sin companies in the study are adopting an effective strategy, as the media 
will pick up on unexpected bad news from companies with a high reputation more than those where 
there are tarnished expectations (Chandler et al., 2019, Stabler & Fischer, 2020).  The findings 
supplement those of Cai et al. (2012) who found that CSR engagement positively enhances firm 
value in controversial industries, as this study also looks at possible explanations through the lens of 
legitimacy seeking via CSR. This calls into question the suggestion by Leung and Snell (2021) that 
gambling companies should report in a reflexive manner that openly discusses their moral 
challenges to sustain moral legitimacy, as this might only call adverse attention to themselves. 
 
Sin companies cannot afford to be complacent if their competitors are receiving unfavourable 
attention, even if they themselves are not, at any particular time. In fact, industry consolidation 
among the big players suggests reduced competition, which may in itself invite more regulatory 
scrutiny. It is probably best in the longer term for all sin companies if there is no bad publicity of any 
kind, since there may be a contagion effect, and subsequent punitive regulation can affect all 
companies. 
 
The paper has shown how companies in controversial industries try to use CSR to stay within 
survivable legitimacy limits, meaning staying out of the ‘illegitimate’ category, at minimum. This 
demonstrates particular dynamics with respect to legitimation tactics compared to other types of 
industries. It also demonstrates the dynamism inherent in legitimacy frameworks. The purposes of 
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legitimacy, or why it matters, is not a simple list, but some purposes may be subservient to others, 
i.e., engaging certain strategic stakeholders, like community leaders, via CSR may be done for the 
ultimate purpose of financial prosperity through benign regulation. Similarly, stakeholders are 
interrelated, so favourable media coverage can influence lawmakers to take a hands-off approach. 
The aspiration is that embedded pragmatic legitimacy may ultimately yield cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy, and possibly even move the company from the ‘debated’ toward the ‘proper’ category 
(Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). However, the surge in ethical or impact investing as 
mainstream, putting moral legitimacy front and center, comprise obstacles in the way of sin 
industries to prove their legitimacy despite pragmatic achievements. According to Bloomberg 
(2021), Global ESG assets are on track to exceed $53 trillion by 2025, representing more than a third 
of the $140.5 trillion in projected total assets under management. as sustainability inflows into 
Exchange Traded Funds surpassed all other ETFs in Europe for the first quarter of 2021 (Johnson, 
2021).  
 
From what is seen of actual events in sin industries, there are always actions and violations that push 
back against enhancing legitimacy, threatening financial performance and even survival. Adverse 
measures by government, like the imposition of higher taxes in sin industries and additional 
restrictions like the £2 limit on FOBTs have occurred, despite CSR claims by the companies. This 
suggests that pragmatic CSR on its own can win only limited success.  According to Miller and 
Michelson (2013),  in their study of gambling companies that engage in CSR practices, there is a need 
to appreciate the related issues of legitimacy, morality policy and framing when publicising their 
social actions. 
 
The methodology of multiple case study design in two different sin industries, combined content 
analysis of CSR reports, juxtaposed against analysis of the environment in which the companies 
operate collectively, as well as their individual actions. This allowed for a comprehensive and 
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inclusive understanding of the interplay of CSR and legitimacy. The method also produces insights 
into the dynamic working balance between industry legitimation and firm differentiation (Suddaby 
et al., 2017). Previous research largely included the juxtaposition of actuality in analysis of only 
single case studies. Thus, this research allows for a broader understanding of industry context.  
 
Further research on CSR in other sin industries and other jurisdictions with different regulatory 
situations could shed further light on the achievement or denial of different types of legitimacy, not 
only in sin industries, taking account of the different dimensions of legitimacy and the dynamics of 
legitimation. Studying different time periods as industries change would also be of value. For 
example, e-cigarettes as substitutes in the tobacco industry, are also a cause of further controversy, 
and some tobacco companies are even investing in legalized cannabis projects (Hancock, 2019). 
Similarly, the nature of gambling is changing rapidly, with the fast growth of online gambling 
available 24 hours a day on all devices. Understanding the implications to create more problem 
gambling addictions is important, along with the challenges of monitoring this activity, which is still 
illegal in many jurisdictions, even as more states in the USA legalise online gambling.  
 
The categorisation of companies as being in sin industries is dynamic. For instance, as issues of 
climate change are increasingly highlighted, firms in environmentally sensitive industries are coming 
to the fore as controversial stigmatised enterprises, especially fossil fuels companies. The nature of 
CSR reporting in these newly designated sin companies should be studied to add to our knowledge 
of sin industries. Industries which have been involved in scandals and how they attempt to retain 
legitimacy compared to sin industries in their self-portrayals would also be of interest, for example, 
financial institutions after the financial crisis of 2008, when it is arguable that their moral and 
cultural-cognitive legitimacy was decimated. While content analysis is useful, it would also be 
worthwhile to supplement content analysis with interviews with key executives, although obtaining 
candor in such interviews might be problematic. It is also recognised that there are ways other than 
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CSR and reporting that constitute legitimacy seeking behaviour. For example, companies may 
change their names to disguise their business, as did two of the tobacco companies by dropping the 
word ‘tobacco’. Kuruppu et al. (2019) point out that if action is required in the short-term to manage 
a problem or an initiative, reporting will not do. Such a situation requires prompt dealing with salient 
stakeholders. However, on a longer-term ongoing basis, reporting actions taken, including CSR 
actions, can be effective. 
 
Since this study confirms that regular CSR reports are intrinsic to impression management by sin 
companies to prove that they are legitimate businesses, just like any other, it could be of value to 
stakeholders in how they deal with sin companies, to look behind the façade of their CSR reports, in 
understanding their motives and strategies when they portray their CSR activities, until there are 
more objective systematic accounts available, to be overseen by Accounting regulators . Significant 
stakeholders could include legislators, regulators, educators and consumers, as well as those who 
















Abbott, W F. and Monsen, R J. (1979), ‘On the measurement of corporate social responsibility: Self-
reported disclosures as a method of measuring corporate social involvement’, Academy of 
Management Journal, 22(3), 501-515. 
 
ASH Action on Smoking and Health (2002), Imperial Tobacco plc: Profit and Growth from Smuggling. 
[pdf] Available at: http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_234.pdf 
 




ASH Action on Smoking and Health (2017), The UK Tobacco Industry  [pdf] Available at 
https://ash.org.uk/information-and-resources/fact-sheets/the-uk-tobacco-industry/ 
 
Ashforth, B.E. and Gibbs, B.W. (1990), ‘The double-edge of organizational legitimation’, 
Organization Science, 1(2), 177–194. 
 
Banerjee, S.B. (2008), ‘Corporate social responsibility: The good, the bad and the ugly’, Critical 
Sociology, 34(1), 51–79. 
 
Barker, R., Eccles, R.G. and Serafeim, G. (2020), ‘The future of ESG is…Accounting’, Harvard Business 
Review, December 03, Published online https://hbr.org/2020/12/the-future-of-esg-is-
accounting 
 
BBC News (2008), How a gambling addict lost £2.1m. [Online] Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7243656.stm 
 
BBC News (2018), Gambling machine climbdown means new rules go ahead in April. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46205812 
 




Betfair casino scam (2010), The tale of Betfair’s casino happy hour bonus scam.  [Online] Available 
at: http://www.rouletteonline.net/online-casino-scams/betfair-casino/ 
 




Blitz, D. and Fabozzi, F.J. (2017), ‘Sin stocks revisited: Resolving the sin stock anomaly’, Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 44(1), 105-111. 
 








Branston, J.R. and Gilmore, A.B. (2019), ‘The failure of the UK to adequately tax tobacco profits’, 
Journal of Public Health, fdz004. (https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/advance-article-
abstract/doi/10.1093/pubmed/fdz004/5307071?redirectedFrom=fulltext) 
 




Brown, T. J. and Dacin, P. A. (1997), ‘The company and the product: Corporate associations and 
consumer product responses’, Journal of Marketing, 61(1), 68–84. 
 
 Buhr, N., Gray, R. and Milne, M.J. (2014), ‘Histories, rationales, voluntary standards and future 
prospects for sustainability reporting’. Bebbington, J., Uneman, J. and O’Dwyer, B. (Eds.) 
Sustainability Accounting and Accountability. Second edition. Routledge. Oxford and New 
York, pp 51-71. 
 
Burn, J. (2019), ‘Betfred owners fined £322,000 for checking failures over stolen money’, Racing 
Post. Available at: https://www.racingpost.com/news/betfred-owners-hit-with-322000-fine-
for-money-laundering-failures/403553 
 
Cai, Y., Jo, H. and Pan, C. (2012), ‘Doing well while doing bad? CSR in controversial industry sectors’, 
Journal of Business Ethics, 108(4), 467–480. 
 
Campbell, D., Craven, B. and Shrives, P. (2003), ‘Voluntary social reporting in three FTSE sectors: a 
comment on perception and legitimacy’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 16(4), 
558-581. 
 
Chandler, D., Polidoro, F. and Yang, W. (2019), ‘When is it good to be bad? Contrasting effects of 
multiple reputations for bad behavior on media coverage of serious organizational errors’, 
Academy of Management Journal, Published Online: 24 Jun 2019. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2017.1248 
 
Cho, C.H., Laine, M., Roberts, R.W. and Rodrigue, M. (2015). ‘Organized hypocrisy, organizational 
façades, and sustainability reporting’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 40, 78-94. 
 
Cowen, S.S., Ferreri, L.B. and Parker, L.D. (1987), ‘The impact of corporate characteristics on social 
responsibility disclosure: A typology and frequency-based analysis’, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 12(2), 111–122. 
 




Davies, R. (2017), ‘UK gambling industry now takes £14bn a year from punters – report’, The 
Guardian. [0nline] Available at:  https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/aug/31/uk-
gambling-industry-takes-14bn-year-punters 
35 
Deephouse, D.L., Bundy, J., Tost, L.P. and Suchman, M.C. (2017), ‘Organizational legitimacy: Six key 
questions’, Chapter 1 in Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T, & Meyer, R. (Eds.). The Sage 
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 




Dowling, J. and Pfeffer, J. (1975), ‘Organizational legitimacy: Social values and organizational 
behavior’, The Pacific Sociological Review, 18(1), 122-136. 
 
Edwards, R., Hoek,J.,  Waa, A., Thomson, G. and Wilson, N. ‘Progress towards a Smokefree Aotearoa 




European Commission. Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs. Unit D. 
(2002), Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development. 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. [pdf] Available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/february/tradoc_127374.pdf 
   
Eurosif. (2012), European SRI Study. Online [pdf] Available at: http://www.eurosif.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/eurosif-sri-study_low-res-v1.1.pdf 
 
Ford. J. (2019), ‘The bet that failed’. Financial Times Magazine, 20 July, 12-20. 
 
Galvin, T. L., M. J. Ventresca, M. J. and Hudson, B. A. ( 2004), ‘Contested industry dynamics: new 
directions in the study of legitimacy’, International Studies of Management and Organization, 
34(4), 56-82. 
 




Gambling Commission. (2019), Industry Statistics. Birmingham: Gambling Commission. 
 




Gerges, D. (2011), ‘Punters’ fury as Betfair refuses to pay out millions after mistakenly offering 28-1 








Gray, R. (2006). ‘Social, environmental and sustainability reporting and organisational value 
creation?’ Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19(6), 793-819.  
36 
 
Griffiths, M.D., Wood, R.T.A. and Parke, J. (2009), ‘Social responsibility tools in online gambling: A 
survey of attitudes and behavior among Internet gamblers’, CyberPsychology & Behavior, 
12(4), 413–421.  
 
Grinols, E.L. and Mustard, D.B. (2001), ‘Business profitability versus social profitability: Evaluating 
industries with externalities, the case of casinos’, Managerial and Decision Economics, 
22(1/3), 143–162. 
 
GRI Standards. https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center/ 
 
Grougiou, V., Dedoulis, E. and Levintis, S. (2016), ‘Corporate social responsibility reporting and 
organizational stigma: The case of sin industries’, Journal of Business Research, 69, 905-914. 
 
Hancock, A. (2019), ‘Imperial strikes £75m Canadian cannabis deal’, Financial Times, 26th July, 17. 
 
Hancock, L., Schellinck, T. and Schrans, T. (2008), ‚Gambling and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR): Re-defining industry and state roles on duty of care, host responsibility and risk 
management’, Policy and Society, 27(1), 55–68. 
 
Hastings, R. (2012), ‘MPs took gifts from tobacco company Japan tobacco international’, The 
Independent, [Online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mps-
took-gifts-from-tobacco-company-japan-tobacco-international-7897128.html 
 
Henderson D. (2001), Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility. London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs. 
 
Henderson, E.C. (2000), Understanding Addiction. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 
 
Henriksson, L.E. (2001), ‘Gambling in Canada: Some insights for cost-benefit analysis’, Managerial 
and Decision Economics, 22(1/3), 113–123. 
 
Holsti, O. R. (1969), Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, Mass., 
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
 
Imperial Tobacco Group Plc, 2016. Annual Report and Accounts 2015. [Online] Available at: 
http://ar15.imperial-tobacco.com/pdfs/full-annual-report-2015.pdf 
 
IPPR (2016). Cards on the Table - The Cost to Government Associated with People Who Are Problem 
Gamblers. Institute for Public Policy Research. Available at  
https://www.ippr.org/files/publications/pdf/Cards-on-the-table_Dec16.pdf 
 
Japan Tobacco International, 2016. JTI Group Sustainability Report FY2015. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.jti.com/files/6514/6469/4924/CSR_2015_INTERACTIVE_27052016_2.pdf 
 
Jarvis, A.A. (2013), ‘A terrifying parable of the addictive power of internet gambling: It began with a 
£5 online bet. Then this ex-major gambled away £750, 000 - and his family’, Daily Mail, 





Johnson, S. (2021). ‘European sustainable fund inflows surpass all other ETFs for first time’, Financial 
Times, 27 April, 11. 
 
Jones, P., Hillier, D. and Comfort, D. (2009), ‘Corporate social responsibility in the UK gambling 
industry’, Corporate Governance, 9(2), 189-201. 
 
Key, S. and Popkin, S.J. (1998), ‘Integrating ethics into the strategic management process: Doing 
well by doing good’, Management Decision, 36(5), 331–338. 
 




Kondracki, N. L. and Wellman, N. S. (2002), ‘Content analysis: Review of methods and their 
applications in nutrition education’, Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior, 34, 224-230. 
 
Kuruppu, S.C., Milne, M.J. and Tilt, C.A. (2019 in press), ‘Gaining, maintaining and repairing 
organisational legitimacy: When to report and when not to report’, Accounting Auditing & 
Accountability Journal (forthcoming) 
 
Laczniak, G. R. and Murphy, P. E. (2007), ‘Normative perspectives for ethical and socially responsible 
marketing’,  Journal of Macromarketing, 26(2), 154–177. 
 




Lamin, A. and Zaheer, S. (2012), ‘Wall Street vs. Main Street: Firm strategies for defending 
legitimacy and their impact on different stakeholders’, Organization Science, 23, 47-66. 
 
Leung, S., Parker, L and Courtis, J. (2015), ‘Impression management through minimal financial 
disclosure in annual reports’, The British Accounting Review, 47, 275-289. 
 
Leung, T.C.H. and Snell, R.S. (2021), Strategies for social and environmental disclosure: The case of 
multinational gambling companies’, Journal of Business Ethics, 168, 447-467. 
 





McLeman, N. (2016), ‘Betting companies sponsoring tennis tournaments is ‘hypocritical’’, The 
Mirror. [Online]  Available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/tennis/andy-murray-believes-
hypocritical-allow-7202963 
 
Meikle, J. (2002), ‘BAT sorry for offer to sponsor student’, The Guardian, [Online] Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/oct/11/highereducation.education 
 
Miller, R. and Michelson, G. (2013), ‘Fixing the game? Legitimacy, morality policy and research in 
gambling’, Journal of Business Ethics, 116(3), 601–614. 
 
38 
Milne, M.J. and Gray, R. (2013), ‘W(h)ither ecology? The triple bottom line, the Global Reporting 
Initiative, and corporate sustainability reporting’, Journal of Business Ethics, 118, 13-29.  
 
Mitchell, R.K., Agle B.R. and Wood D.J. (1997), Toward a theory of stakeholder Identification and 
salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts’, Academy of Management 
Review, 22, 853-886. 
 
Monaghan, S. (2009), ‘Internet gambling—Not just a fad’, International Gambling Studies, 9(1), 1–4. 
 
NatCen Social Research.  (2017), Gambling Behaviour in Great Britain in 2015: Evidence from 




NatCen Social Research.  (2018), Gambling Behaviour in Great Britain in 2016: Evidence from 




Newall, P.W.S., Moodie, C., Reith, G., Stead, M., Critchlow, N., Morgan, A. and Dobbie, F. (2019), 
‘Gambling marketing from 2014 to 2018: a literature review’, Current Addiction Reports, 6(2), 
49-56. 
 
Nilsson, P. (2020). ‘BAT boosted as smokers stick to premium cigarette brands’, Financial Times, 1 
August, 14. 
 
Nilsson, P. (2021). ‘Imperial pivots back to neglected cigarettes’, Financial Times, 28 January, 12. 
 
Nilsson, P. (2021a). ‘Imperial and peers hit by US crackdown fears’. Financial Times, 21 April, 12.  
 
O’Donovan, G. (2002), ‘Environmental disclosures in the annual report’, Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 15(3), 344–371. 
 








Palazzo, G. and Richter, U. (2005), ‘CSR business as usual? The case of the tobacco industry’, Journal 
of Business Ethics, 61(4), 387–401. 
 
Patten, D.M. (1992), ‘Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the Alaskan oil spill: A 
note on legitimacy theory’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17(5), 471-475. 
 





Pratten, J. D. and Walton, S. (2009), Policy and Reality: Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK 
Gambling Industry. Available at: 
http://rgtinfohub.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/prattenwalton.pdf 
 




Reast, J., Maon, F., Lindgreen, A. and Vanhamme, J. (2012), ‘Legitimacy-seeking organizational 
strategies in controversial industries: A case study analysis and a bi-dimensional 
model’, Journal of Business Ethics, 118(1), 139–153. 
 
Sethi, S.P. (1978), ‘Advocacy advertising—The American experience’, California Management 
Review, 21(1), 55–68. 
 
Soriano, M. Y. D., Javed, U. and Yousafzai, S. (2012), ‘Can an industry be socially responsible if its 
products harm consumers? The case of online gambling’, Journal of Business Ethics, 110, 481-
497. 
 
Stabler, S. and Fischer, M. (2020), ‘When does corporate social irresponsibility become news? 
Evidence from more than 1000 brand transgressions across five countries’ , Journal of 
Marketing, 84(3), 46-67. 
 
Suchman, M. (1995), ‘Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches’, The Academy of 
Management Review, 20(3), 571-610. 
 
Suddaby, R., Bitektine, A. and Haack, P. (2017), ‘Legitimacy’, Academy of Management Annals, 11, 
451-478. 
 
The Guardian (2016), We ban tobacco sponsorship of sport in the UK. Let’s stub it out in the arts, 




The Journal.ie (2014), Paddy Power withdraws Pistorius ad after it becomes most complained about 
ever. Available at: https://www.thejournal.ie/paddy-power-withdraw-oscar-pistorius-ad-
1347288-Mar2014/ 
 
Tilling, M.V. and Tilt, C.A. (2010), ‘The edge of legitimacy’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 23(1), 55-81. 
 
Tobin, L. (2011), ‘Furore over Durham’s tobacco funding for afghan scholarship’, The Guardian 
[Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/education/2011/jun/07/durham-
university-tobacco-funding-afghan-award 
 
William Hill (2016), Making a Positive Difference. [Online] Available at:  
http://files.williamhillplc.com/media/3925/csr-report-2016.pdf 
 




Wiseman, J. (1982). ‘An evaluation of environmental disclosures made in corporate annual reports’, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 7(1), 53-63. 
 
World Health Organization (2004), Tobacco Industry and Corporate Responsibility…an Inherent 
Contradiction. Available at: http://www.who.int/tobacco/communications/CSR_report.pdf 
 
World Health Organisation (2008), Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: on the protection of public health policies with 
respect to tobacco control from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco 
industry. Available at: http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf 
 


































































• Grant or withhold 
      critical resources 
Figure1. Stakeholder Legitimacy Seeking by Sin Companies  
42 
Table 1. Coding References by Tobacco companies 
NODES (THEMES) British American Tobacco Imperial Tobacco Japan Tobacco 
International 
 References References References 
Actions and Steps taken 4 2 4 
Attitude towards CSR 3 4 2 
Attitude towards Technology 3 0 1 
Awards and Accreditation 0 0 1 
Background information 1 2 1 
Challenges:    
--Economic challenges 2 0 1 
--Environmental challenges 0 1 0 
--Operational challenges 3 1 1 
--Socio-cultural challenges 2 0 1 
Consumer Orientation 1 1 1 
CSR Strategy 4 2 2 
Employee Orientation 0 1 2 
Failures and Self-criticism 0 1 1 
Governmental and Organisational 
references 
1 0 1 
Past Achievements 0 1 2 
Set standards and Values 2 5 0 
Stakeholder Orientation 1 1 3 









Table 2. Coding References by Gambling Companies 
NODES (THEMES) William  
Hill 
Ladbrokes Playtech Betfair Paddy  
Power 
Gala Coral  
Group 
Betfred 
 References References References References References References References 
Actions or steps 
taken 
3 3 6 5 4 3 3 
Attitude towards 
CSR 
2 2 2 3 1 5 4 
Attitude towards 
technology 
2 0 2 1 2 3 0 
Awards and 
accreditation 
0 0 2 1 0 0 1 
Background 
information 
1 2 3 2 2 1 1 
Challenges        
--Economic 
challenges 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
--Environmental 
challenges 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
--Operational 
challenges 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
--Socio-cultural 
challenges 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Consumer 
orientation 
3 1 2 2 2 4 3 
CSR strategy 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 
Employees 
orientation 
5 3 3 3 4 0 5 
Failures and self-
criticism 




1 2 5 4 4 1 2 
Past achievements 5 3 0 4 6 0 0 
Set standards & 
values 
0 1 2 1 2 3 2 
Stakeholders 
orientation 
0 0 2 0 0 1 2 
Sustainability 
goals 




Table 3. Word Frequencies for Tobacco Companies 
British American Tobacco Imperial Tobacco  Japan Tobacco International 
Word Count Weighted  
Percentage 
(%) 
Word Count Weighted  
Percentage 
(%) 
Word Count Weighted 
 Percentage 
(%) 
Business 6 1.71 Products 4 3.08 Business 7 2.46 
Corporate 5 1.43 Tobacco 4 3.08 Tobacco 7 2.46 
Take 5 1.43 Business 3 2.31 Group 6 2.11 
Tobacco 5 1.43 Responsible 3 2.31 Sustainability 6 2.11 
Agriculture 4 1.14 Also 2 1.54 Also 4 1.40 
Around 4 1.14 Brands 2 1.54 2015 3 1.05 
Behaviour 4 1.14 Impacts 2 1.54 Area 3 1.05 
Chief 4 1.14 Important 2 1.54 Began 3 1.05 
Executive 4 1.14 Make 2 1.54 Made 3 1.05 

















Table 4. Word Frequencies for Gambling Companies 
William Hill  Ladbrokes Gala Coral Group Betfred 
Word Count Wt 
% 
Word Count Wt 
% 
Word Count Wt% Word Count Wt 
% 
Gambling 28 2.23 Business 8 2.56 Gambling 21 3.73 Gambling 19 3.00 
Responsible 22 1.75 Ladbrokes 7 2.24 Betting 11 1.95 Staff 11 1.74 
Community 17 1.35 Responsible 7 2.24 Responsible 11 1.95 Betfred 10 1.58 
Colleagues 15 1.19 Gambling 6 1.92 Customers 10 1.78 Customers 10 1.58 
Safe 15 1.19 Year 6 1.92 Industry 8 1.42 Regard 6 0.95 
Customers 14 1.11 2015 4 1.28 Sports 8 1.42 Shops 6 0.95 
Local 14 1.11 Chief 4 1.28 Coral 7 1.24 Age 5 0.79 
Continue 12 0.96 Executive 4 1.28 Together 7 1.24 Commission 5 0.79 
Work 12 0.96 Industry 4 1.28 Also 6 1.07 Crime 5 0.79 
People 11 0.88 Performance 4 1.28 Integrity 6 1.07 Key 5 0.79 
  
Paddy Power  Playtech Betfair 
Word Count Weighted 
Percentage 
(%) 
Word Count Weighted 
Percentage 
(%) 
Word Count Weighted 
Percentage 
(%) 
Gambling 32 1.65 Gambling 22 1.61 Gambling 31 1.49 
Power 24 1.24 Licensees 15 1.10 Corporate 22 1.06 
Customers 22 1.13 Employees 14 1.02 Responsible 17 0.82 
2015 20 1.03 Group 12 0.88 Health 16 0.77 
Responsible 20 1.03 Responsible 12 0.88 Report 16 0.77 
Paddy 19 0.98 Industry 10 0.73 Charity 14 0.67 
Customer 15 0.77 Ensure 9 0.66 Safety 13 0.62 
People 15 0.77 Provides 9 0.66 Year 13 0.62 
Health 14 0.72 Training 9 0.66 Employees 12 0.58 





Table 5. Sin Companies Self Portrayal in CSR Reports versus Actual Behaviour/Practices 
(a) Tobacco Companies  
 




 CSR Reports Actual Behaviour/Practices 
Regulatory 
no mention of challenges payments to politicians, illegal marketing, 
advertising, selling, cover up of 
environmental violations, smuggling, tax 
avoidance 
Pragmatic 
actions to reduce harmful effects of 
tobacco, responsible marketing; CSR 
reports do not address less powerful 
stakeholders 
endowments to universities and NGOs, 
targeting traditional cigarette sales, name 
changes to camouflage ‘tobacco’ 
Moral --- 
payments to politicians, illegal marketing, 
advertising, selling, cover up of 
environmental violations, smuggling, tax 
avoidance 
Cultural/Cognitive 
declaration of CSR standards, values; 
emphasis on sustainability 
endowments to NGOs and cultural/ arts 
institutions  
 CSR Reports Actual Behaviour/Practices 
Regulatory 
no mention of challenges strong resistance to restrictive legislation, 
payments to politicians; money laundering, 
targeted marketing to vulnerable individuals 
and people, mutual dependence with 
reduced sports sponsorship; violations of 
self-exclusion schemes, moving to more 
loosely regulated jurisdictions  
Pragmatic 
Self-exclusions approaches; training for 
employees; gambling protection groups 
 
Moral --- 
strong resistance to restrictive legislation, 
payments to politicians; money laundering, 
targeted marketing to vulnerable individuals 
and people, mutual dependence with 
reduced sports sponsorship; violations of 
self-exclusion schemes 
Cultural/Cognitive 
declaration of CSR standards, values; 
declarations of responsible gambling and 
advertising; community initiatives 
charity contributions  
